A hostile world for nonhuman animals : human identification and the oppression of nonhuman animals for human good by Peggs, Kay
 1 
A hostile world for nonhuman animals: human identification and the oppression of 




This is an accepted, postprint version of the published manuscript -  Peggs, K (2009) 
A Hostile World for Nonhuman Animals: Human Identification and the Oppression of 




In 2006 over three million experiments were performed on nonhuman animals.  In 
making an argument against such experiments I contend that approval of nonhuman 
animal experimentation is rooted in acceptance of humans as having essential 
primacy over nonhuman animals and lies in the power relations associated with 
human primacy identity claims.  To challenge essentialist notions of human identity 
and human primacy I utilise a performative conceptualisation of identity. Discourses 
used by Pro-Test, a lobby that promotes nonhuman animal experimentation, allows 
an exploration of justifications made for animal experimentation.  In promoting such 
experiments, I argue, Pro-Test is engaging in a form of human primacy identity 
politics based in continued inequality and the sustained oppression of nonhuman 
animals.  I conclude that discourses extolling scientific advancements for human 
benefits, made on the basis of experiments on nonhuman animals, reiterate an 
immoral human primacy identity that dissolutely exploits power relations to privilege 
the human. 
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In Britain in 2006 3.01 million ‘procedures’ were performed on nonhuman animals, 
an increase on the 2.9 million performed in 2005 (Pro-Test, 2007).  In citing these 
Home Office figures, Pro-Test (2007) (a lobby launched in Britain in January 2006 to 
promote experimentsii on nonhuman animals), declares that it ‘welcome[s] statistics 
on animal research in 2006’, even though the figures indicate an increase. How can 
Pro-Test take this position?  In making an argument against such experimentation I 
contend that Pro-Test’s position is based in the acceptance of ‘human’ as having 
primacy over ‘animal’iii, since Pro-Test grounds its case in the assumed pre-eminence 
of human needs over those of nonhuman animals.  I maintain that assumed human 
primacy is used by Pro-Test as a justification for the exploitation of nonhuman 
animals for human benefit.  My purpose is to draw attention to the ways in which 
Pro-Test seeks to validate experiments on nonhuman animals by using discourses 
that imply hierarchical differences between human and nonhuman animals that 
inform the ‘in’ identity of ‘human’ and the ‘otherness’ of all nonhuman animals.  
Following Jacques Derrida’s claim that exclusionary identity is an act of power 
(Laclau 1990) I maintain that this is a form of human primacy identity politics, not 
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based in overcoming oppression and inequality, but based in continued inequality 
and the sustained oppression of nonhuman animals.   
 
Although organic differences exist among all animals (human and nonhuman), the 
‘key’ division between human and nonhuman animals is founded in scientific 
categorizations of hierarchical differences that are a display of human identity since 
hierarchical distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ are founded in, I argue, judgments 
and choices rather than in naturally occurring scientifically verifiable hierarchical 
divisions.  In this regard the conceptualisation of identity as performative (Butler 
1999) is compelling since this stresses that ‘our activities and practices…are not 
expressions of some prior identity…but are the very means by which we come to be 
what we are’ (Loxley, 2007: 118).  Thus I begin with an examination of identity and 
‘otherness’ which allows me to explore notions of resemblance and difference and 
the ways in which nonhuman animals have been, and continue to be, seen by and 
treated by humans as excluded ‘other’.  The notion of identity as performative 
enables me to conceptualise human identity as a performative selectivity often 
defined politically through notions of human primacy over nonhuman animals.  This 
leads me to contend that nonhuman animals are anthropolatricallyiv approved 
resources for actions that results in human gain, and such actions are based in power 
relations between human and nonhuman animals.   
 
Human primacy discourses are fundamental to human primacy identity politics since 
such discourses influence perceptions of the relationship between human and 
nonhuman animals and reflect and reinforce any notions we might have of our own 
superiority.   An analysis of statements made by Pro-Test (2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 
2007) offers the opportunity to explore such discourses.  By looking in detail at 
claims made by Pro-Test I conclude that discourses extolling scientific advancements 
that are founded in the exploitation of nonhuman animals for human benefit do not 
point to human moral progress, but rather are a reiteration of an immoral human 
primacy identity that dissolutely exploits power relations to privilege the human.  I 
close by confronting the difficulties associated with conjoining a deconstructionist 
analysis of human identity with an argument in favour of a particular moral 
standpoint.  Here I am guided by Zygmunt Bauman’s (1993) contention that the very 
deconstruction of enlightenment certainties can itself lead to moral improvement. 
 
Identity and the other: the mark of nonhuman 
 
My aim in this section is to explore the concept of identity in relation to 
anthropolatrical conceptualisations of differences between humans and nonhuman 
animals, conceptualisations used to justify human gains achieved via nonhuman 
animal costs.  Theoretical discussions about human identity in Sociology have moved 
away from conceptualisations of fixed identities to conceptualisations of new forms 
of deconstructed fragmented identification (Hall, 1996).  For example Anthony 
Giddens argues that ‘individuals tend to develop multiple selves in which there is no 
inner core of self identity’ since we manipulate our conduct and our appearance in 
order to fit in with particular requirements and locales (1991: 100).  Thus belonging 
is vital in identification.  Individual self-identities are based in collectivities, for 
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example at cultural, national and global levels, and here we might refer to collective 
social identities (eg based in gender, class or national identity), which provide 
frameworks of resemblance to and difference from other people (Jenkins 2004).  
Resemblance and difference have long been viewed as fundamental to 
conceptualisations of identification.  In the seventeenth century John Locke argued 
that ‘there is no point in asking for an account of identity by itself, but only for an 
account of what it is to be the same thing of a certain kind’ (Noonan, 1998: 313).  
Still, Locke argued, resemblance functions simultaneously with difference since that 
which forms the identity of one sort of matter may be different from that which 
forms the identity of another sort of matter (Lowe, 1989: 2).   Thus, as Stuart Hall 
pointed out much more recently, ‘identities are constructed through, not outside, 
difference’ (1996: 4), as a result, Hall continues, ‘…identities can function as points of 
identification and attachment only because of their capacity to exclude, to leave out, 
to render ‘outside’, abjected’ (1996: 5, original emphasis).  However, difference and 
resemblance are messy concepts in identification because the accomplishment of 
resemblance (and difference) relies in the discounting of some differences (and 
similarities).  For example, identification (eg human) can be accomplished in 
recognition of ‘significant’ similarities (eg language use) and the discounting of 
differences judged less ‘significant’ (eg density of body hair).  Moreover, differences 
(eg ability to fly unaided) among those designated as ‘other’ (eg nonhuman animals) 
are also diluted in the interests of the positing of the ‘other’ as excluded from ‘us’ 
(eg human).  Drawing on the work of Jacques Derrida, Ernesto Laclau contends that it 
is through this exclusion of the ‘other’ that we can see that the ‘constitution of 
identity is an act of power’ (1990: 33).  For Derrida, the foundation of identity is 
exclusion established in hierarchically defined binary oppositions (e.g. black/white, 
man/woman, human/animal, person/thing) (Laclau, 1990: 33).  What is characteristic 
of the excluded second ‘marked’ term  (e.g. black, woman, animal, thing) is that it is 
allocated to the subordinate limit of the ‘violent hierarchy between the two 
resultant poles’ (Laclau, 1990: 33).  The marking of the term ‘animal’ at the 
subordinate pole is established in essentialist discourses about ‘natural’ divisions 
between ‘them’ and ‘us,’ positing distinctive essentialist identities that results not 
least in the assumed pre-eminence of ‘our’ needs over ‘theirs’, seen not least in the 
use of nonhuman animals in experiments for human benefit.  
 
Essentialist assumptions have, of course, a very long history.  In the seventeenth 
century the ‘conceptual ground was…cleared to differentiate ‘human’ nature from 
‘animal’ nature’ (Anderson 1998: 30) via Rene Descartes notion that ‘the mind is 
distinct from and superior to matter’ (Sutcliffe, 1968: 19).  Cartesian scientists 
accorded humans exclusive access to our conscious minds with nonhuman animals, 
in contrast, being declared incapable of thinking and hence incapable of feeling pain 
(Rowlands, 2002: 3).  Although ‘Descartes’s naïve mechanistic belief that animals 
were actually unconscious… [has been] radically undermined by the advance of 
ethology’ (Midgley, 2002 [1979]: 138), still concepts such as consciousness ‘are often 
defined on the basis of what humans do’ (Hauser, 2000: xviii).  Accordingly power 
relationary subject positions between ‘human’ and ‘animal’ are made ‘natural’ via 
discourses about innate differences that obscure the centrality of power in 
hierarchical insider/outsider classifications and which mask the heterogeneity of the 
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living.  So although ‘[t]here is no animal in the general singular, separated from man 
(sic) by a single indivisible limit’ (Derrida, 2004: 125), in scientific and public 
discourses such identification is typically based in assumptions of natural differences 
that focus on the shared characteristics of designated groups.   These discourses take 
for granted the view that the essentialist premise of the fundamental categorisation 
of human/animal is universal and natural, and in so doing obscure the social 
construction of the categorisation and the attendant power relations.  But Derrida’s 
comments draw us away from notions of essential differences to a conceptualisation 
of identity, to borrow Halls’ terminology, as ‘a construction, a process.’ (1996: 2).  
This affords the capacity to focus on the social construction of rather than on any 
‘natural’ disposition to specific identities and to centre on human and nonhuman 
animal identities as phenomena that are products of human power rather than as 
things that are predetermined.   
 
Although change is fundamental to identification, Richard Jenkins’ notion of  
‘primary identities’ points to identities established in earlier life (e.g. humanness and 
gender) that are ‘more robust and resilient to change later in life than other 
identities’ (2004: 19).  However, Judith Butler’s (1999) notion of the ‘performative 
subject’ enables a querying of the claim that humanness is an essential primary 
identity, let alone a primacy identity.   In holding that gender is ‘performative’ Butler 
(1999) counters the idea that there is something essential to gender identity.  Thus 
‘what we take to be an internal essence of gender is manufactured through a 
sustained set of acts, posited through the gendered stylisation of the body’ (1999: 
xv).  So, ‘gender is not an expression of what one is; it is what one does’ (Lloyd, 2005: 
25 original emphasis).  Consequently gender identity is always in process and it 
needs to be reiterated daily (Lloyd, 2005: 26).  However, Butler does not deny that 
organic differences exist, but, in the case of sex differences, she asks, ‘…under what 
discursive and institutional conditions, do certain biological differences…become the 
salient characteristics of sex?’ (Osborne and Segal, 1994: 36).  I maintain that it is not 
only identities among humans that are performative, human identity is itself 
performative.  Accordingly below I consider the discursive conditions under which 
organic differences among animals are converted into the most significant features 
of the human/nonhuman animal divide, and how these features are used to 




Organic differences exist among all animals but human identity assumptions are 
founded in a recognition of organic differences deemed most significant, that is 
those that underpin the binary hierarchical classification of all animals into ‘human’ 
and ‘animal’. Like gender identities, species identities are performative selectivities, 
interpreted as natural, whereby the ‘‘merely different’ is transformed into the  
‘absolute other’ (Iris Young quoted in Lloyd 2005: 38).  Accordingly, that which is 
presented as ‘natural (or constative) [is] something that is a political effect (a 
performative) secured upon the field of power relations’ (Lloyd, 2005: 39).   ‘So the 
identity ‘woman’ becomes political (becomes feminist) when an antagonism 
emerges with men or patriarchy’ (Lloyd, 2005: 20).  Following on from this I argue 
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that the identity ‘human’ becomes a political identity (human primacy) when there is 
antagonism with nonhuman animal interests in anthropolatric society.  However, 
there are important differences between identity politics and primacy identity 
politics.  In identity politics the goal is usually ‘the call to ‘respect’ traditionally 
disadvantaged social groups’ (Fuller, 2006: 111-2) whereas the goal in primacy 
identity politics is the preservation or extension of existing power relations through 
the continued subjugation of disadvantaged groups.  In identity politics the lack of a 
conception of a stable identity (eg what women share), means that, for many 
feminists, such politics (eg the goal of women’s liberation) is unworkable (Lloyd, 
2005:13).  I maintain that in the case of primacy identity politics there are 
considerable emancipatory possibilities associated with viewing identities as 
destabilised.  Thus Moya Lloyd’s contention that the goal of identity politics can be 
strengthened by a focus on the performative nature of identity is also persuasive for 
challenging exploitation fundamental to primacy identity politics, since such a focus 
‘facilitates an understanding of how particular identity claims have been (and may 
continue to be) made’ (2005: 30).  How has human primacy identity been claimed?    
Jenkins holds that ‘[c]ollective identities are usually located within territories or 
regions’ (2004: 26) and, I contend, the collective identity ‘human primacy’ is forged 
within the virtual territory of human superiority and the actual region of human 
power.  Discourse is central to power relations since discourses based in the actual 
zone of human power facilitate the persistence of the virtual zone of human 
superiority which preserves human exploitation of nonhuman animals.  
 
Discourse is central to our construction of ‘reality’ since ‘linguistic acts don’t simply 
reflect a world … [they] actually have the power to make a world’ (Jackson 2004).   
For example, Lloyd explains that ‘every time we state our sex as female on a form…’ 
(2005: 26) we are reiterated as female.  But, of course, it is not simply through 
discourses that performative identities are shaped since  ‘norms, power relations, 
institutions and practices’ (Lloyd, 2005: 27) are also crucial, however, it is the 
‘reiterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and 
constrains’ (Butler, 1999: 2).  Michel Foucault’s study of governmentality points to 
the ways in which discourses are influential in constructing seemingly essential 
identities.  His historical study shows ‘how effects of truth are produced within 
discourses which in themselves are neither true nor false’ (Gordon, 1980: 118). 
Truth-promoting discourses influence our perceptions of, for example, the 
relationship between humans and nonhuman animals and reflect and reinforce our 
notions of our own transcendence. Nevertheless, if nonhuman animals are no longer 
perceived by humans to be lacking in thought and sensation, as they were by 
Cartesian scientists, how can humans accept, and even promote, experiments on 
nonhuman animals?  Carol, J. Adams argues that our language is structured to 
convey such acceptance (1990: 66).  Below I examine discourses used by Pro-Test to 
promote nonhuman animal experimentation which, I argue, reiterate human 
primacy assumptions and thus acceptance of such experimentation.  
 
A hostile world for nonhuman animals: the primacy identity politics of Pro-Test 
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The campaign group Pro-Test was launched with the stated aim of countering anti-
vivisectionist campaign groups that sought to halt the construction of the new 
Biomedical Research Facility at the University of Oxford (Boggan, 2006).  Pro-Test’s 
website campaign material (2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2007) provides the opportunity to 
explore how this political group reiterates human primacy identity through the 
justification of experimentation on nonhuman animals. Below I examine Pro-Test’s 
stated aims and study key claims; about science, about the caring community of 
scientists, about similarities and differences between human and nonhuman 
animals, and about the scientific and moral ‘necessity’ of experimentation on 
nonhuman animals as a mechanism of human advancement.  
 
The Pro-Test campaign 
 
The stated aims of Pro-Test are  
 
‘…to counter the irrational arguments of anti-vivisectionists by raising public 
awareness of the benefits of animal research and creating an environment 
where scientists can speak out about their work and be proud of the 
contributions they make. We stand for science, reasoned debate and, above 
all, the promotion of the welfare of mankind. Pro-Test exists to support the 
construction of the Oxford lab, to make the case for animal research, and 
more generally to defend scientific research as a necessary tool of human 
progress in a climate that is increasingly misanthropic and suspicious of 
scientists. We support only non-violent protest and condemn those using 
violence or intimidation to further their goals. We strongly support animal 
testing as crucially necessary to further medical science’ (2006a) 
  
Lloyd remarks that ‘without a shared experience of  – an identity – political demands 
cannot be articulated in the first place’ (2005: 55-6).  In the context of this paper I 
reshape this to without a shared experience of and acceptance of ‘supremacy’ – a 
primacy identity – Pro-Test could not begin to articulate political demands based in 
the acceptable exploitation and death of nonhuman animals. Accordingly, for Pro-
Test, experiments on nonhuman animals are justifiable on the grounds that they are 
‘crucially necessary’ for the ‘welfare’ of humans.  To be sure, humans have interests 
but, of course, nonhuman animals have interests as well.   As conscious sentient 
beings, nonhuman animals have desires and preferences (Rowlands, 2002: 23), but 
they are treated as ‘acceptable losses’ (Rowlands, 2002: 212) since ‘[e]ven if we think 
that animals can suffer pain, and even death, but humans can suffer more, in the 
event of a conflict of interests, we would be justified in choosing to sacrifice the 
interests of animals’ (Garner, 2005: 23).  So the identity ‘human’ becomes a political 
identity (human primacy) because antagonism has emerged about nonhuman animal 
interests in anthropolatric society.   I argue that in the interests of human primacy, 
Pro-Test makes a number of claims (considered below) in promotion of nonhuman 
animal experimentation.  Via these claims Pro-Test seeks to preserve a ‘socioethical 
domain’ (Michael and Birke, 1994: 189) in an effort to discursively shield 
vivisectionists from condemnation (eg in claims about ‘the promotion of the welfare 
of mankind’) while at the same time problematizing disapproval of nonhuman 
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animal experimentation (eg in claims about ‘the irrational arguments of anti-
vivisectionists’).   
 
The claim that ‘we stand for science’  
 
Beth Humphries argues that the driving force of knowledge produced by scientists is 
‘ownership by a privileged research community in the interests of dominant groups’ 
(2000: 187).  In the case of nonhuman animal experimentation Pro-Test explicitly 
announces its support for such experiments on the grounds of human benefits.  So 
Pro-Test (2006b) declares that ‘animal testing is a necessary stage in the 
development of new cures, therapies and procedures designed to cure illnesses, 
save lives and improve the quality of human life’. Conservative estimates indicate 
that well over 100 million nonhuman animals worldwide are used in experiments 
every year (Rowlands, 2002: 124) and the research typically intrudes on the physical 
body of a nonhuman animal, causing the pain and suffering that is ‘ often an 
inherent part of scientific procedures without which the work would not have a 
chance of achieving its objectives’ (Rowlands 2005: 121).   However, the utility to 
humans of nonhuman animal experimentation is open to question.   Although Pro-
Test (2006a) asserts that, ‘[w]e strongly support animal testing as crucially necessary 
to further medical science’ the necessity of nonhuman animal experimentation in 
medical research is contentious since there is disagreement among scientists about 
whether such experiments promote human benefits.  For example, the UK medical 
research charity the Dr Hadwen Trust notes ‘serious scientific limitations’ (2006: 3) 
with nonhuman animal experimentsv and concludes that ‘[w]ith animal experiments 
providing unreliable and potentially misleading results, it is irresponsible to portray 
animal research in general as a ‘gold standard’ (2006: 4).  Although it is undeniable 
that many scientists support nonhuman animal experimentation Mark Rowlands 
affirms that numerous scientists do not because much of the research is marginal to 
human interests, is ineffective, and much of the knowledge gained is either already 
available or is obtainable via other means (2002: 150-151).   
 
Even if some nonhuman animal experiments are necessary for the promotion of 
human vital interests, such research would be seen as morally repugnant if it were 
not for notions of human primacy. Taking into account the problems with nonhuman 
animal experiments it could be argued that experiments upon humans would be 
more effective in respect of human utility (Sztybel 2006: 174).  Of course, 
experimenting on humans who are unable or unwilling to give their consent would 
be morally repugnant, and I would not wish to give such a course of action any moral 
sanction.  However, the promotion of conceivably less beneficial and possibly 
detrimental nonhuman animal experiments over more beneficial and valuable 
human experiments emphasizes that human primacy is central to the 
implementation of nonhuman animal experimentation.  Most obviously, scientific 
experiments could not be performed on non-consenting nonhuman animals without 
the assumption of the primacy of those in whose name the experiments are 
performed since it is accepted that it would be highly immoral to carry out such 
experiments on non-consenting humans.  Thus experiments on nonhuman animals 
‘can only be sustained because animals are regarded as expendable slaves, because 
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their suffering is not fairly considered (Sztybel 2006: 188).   Consequently, Adams 
reflects,  ‘animal experimentation seems less a scientific question than a power 
issue’ since it is ‘disenfranchised bodies’ that are used to increase scientific 
knowledge (1995: 138).  Thus, nonhuman animal experimentation, whether 
necessary or not for nonhuman benefits, reiterates human primacy. 
 
The claim that experiments on nonhuman animals lead to ‘the promotion of the 
welfare of mankind’  
 
The ‘vast industry of animal experimentation’ (Singer, 1990: 87) in Britain is 
regulated by the 1986 Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act which incorporates a ‘cost-
benefit clause whereby potential benefits of the procedures are weighed up against 
the suffering intended to be inflicted’ (Garner, 2005: 125).  The purpose of much 
experimentation is, however, to ‘inflict pain and suffering on animals’ (Garner, 2005: 
121).  In promoting nonhuman animal experimentation Pro-Test must engage with 
moral disputevi and in order to defend their position they are compelled, I argue, to 
depend on human primacy, where the suffering inflicted on nonhuman animals is 
viewed as ‘justified morally if it serves a necessary human purpose’ (Garner, 2005: 
125).  It might be argued that Pro-Test’s contention that ‘[a]nimal welfare must be 
taken into consideration, but ultimately, human beings must come first’ (2006a) is 
consistent purely with a moral obligation to the human speciesvii  (eg Williams 2006) 
rather than with affirming human primacy.  However, I maintain that the moral 
obligation position reflects rather than contradicts human primacy notions by relying 
on speciesist assumptions that conform with, to use Peter Singer’s words, the 
‘conventional assumption that we are, simply because we are human, justified in 
overriding the interests of nonhuman animals when they conflict with our own’ 
(2002: 3).  Accordingly, the moral obligation position reiterates human primacy.  In 
this regard Pro-Test asserts that, 
 
‘[t]he cost in animal lives of the life-saving research carried out using animals 
is less than 3 animals per person in the UK over the course of that person's 
lifetime (under 3 million animals per year are used per year, over 90% of 
them animal rodents). Anyone who thinks a human life or the alleviation of 
human suffering is not worth the life of 3 rats has a deeply degraded view of 
the value of human life and well-being’ (2006b: 3-4, original emphasis) 
 
Pro-Test implies that it is self-evident that the welfare of a human is worth the 
suffering and death of three nonhuman animals, especially rats ‘whose public image 
has of course been largely formed by their long history not as pets but as pests’ 
(Midgley, 2004: 148-9).  In a laboratory setting the rat is viewed as ‘a piece of 
laboratory equipment with the function of being used to test hypotheses, a kind of 
purpose-made flesh-and-blood robot’ (Midgley, 2004: 149).  Thus human primacy 
politics awards humans a superior place in a human-constructed order, an order that 
classifies nonhuman animals as resources (Rowlands, 2002: 196) and in so doing 
evaluates them in terms of their utility (and nuisance) to humans. The rat is at once 
classified as a ‘nuisance’ and ‘useful’; s/he is especially utilisable and expendable 
precisely because rats are classified as vermin.  The promotion of nonhuman animal 
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experimentation can be contrasted with political campaigns against, for example, the 
use of human embryos in research (eg evidenced in alarm about research on 
embryonic human stem cellsviii). Such a divergence of endorsement of those judged 
to be acceptable and unacceptable for human welfare scientific experimentation lays 
bare the real power relations that are founded in virtual human primacy. As 
Rowlands argues, even if some research on nonhuman animals is necessary for the 
promotion of human vital interests such research is illegitimate since it rides 
roughshod over the autonomy of nonhuman animals (2002: 147) by curtailing their 
ability to do what they want to do in the favour of how humans want to use them.   
 
Claims about the differences yet similarities between human and nonhuman 
animals  
 
Although experimentation on nonhuman animals is founded in assumptions about 
the otherness of nonhuman animals, the suggestion that the differences are too 
great, thereby making experiments on nonhuman animals speciousix, is dismissed by 
Pro-Test.   
 
‘Animal models are not perfect representations of humans and scientists are 
well aware of this. But, they do serve as excellent substitutes (mostly using 
mice, rats and other small rodents) for humans. As the genomic revolution 
has come around and the genomes of both humans and animals have been 
sequenced, we have realized that there are much more similarities between 
humans and animals than there are differences. It has also enabled us to 
identify where humans and particular animals are identical, as some animals 
serve as accurate representatives of a human's anatomy, while others may 
share identical biochemical pathways. Genomic knowledge has made it so 
that animal research can be much more specifically targeted and accurate 
when representing a human, thus correctly predicting a (sic) how a human 
will react… Mice are actually considered the best model of inherited human 
diseases. This is because they share 99% of all the genes with humans!’ 
(2006b: 2) 
 
The plea is to difference yet similarity. The plea to difference is implicit and 
elemental to Pro-Test’s claims since without difference human benefit reasons for 
nonhuman animal experiments would be morally objectionable.  As we have seen, to 
experiment on those like us (ie humans) would be seen as morally repugnant 
without their consent.   The plea to similarity is explicit and also fundamental to Pro-
Test’s claims since without similarities nonhuman animal experimentation would be 
deemed to be pointless.  So, differences are deemed to be sufficiently significant to 
permit experimentation on nonhuman animals on moral grounds, yet similarities are 
deemed to be adequately apparent to make experiments useful on human benefit 
grounds.    Adams notes that this two-sided  ‘formula for knowledge’ is based in the 
notion that ‘animals are not like us so we can… animals are like us so we 
conclude…’(1995: 52).  Adams (1995) proposes that this confirms that arguments 
that promote animal experimentation are grounded in relations of power rather 
than in organic similarities and differences, which are open to question and 
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manipulation. Indeed the possibilities associated with genetic modification, implies 
Pro-Test, means that differences can be reduced.  Pro-Test claims that mice ‘are 
actually considered the best model of inherited human diseases. This is because they 
share 99% of all the genes with humans!’(2006b: 2)x and Pro-Test (2007) later 
declares that ‘GM animals, mainly mice, can offer better animal models for human 
diseases….’.  If organic differences can be manipulated and reducedxi, justifications 
made by those who promote experiments on nonhuman animals on the basis of 
human primacy and human/nonhuman animal differences become increasingly 
insupportable. 
 
The claim that ‘scientists and their lab technicians care deeply about the welfare of 
the animals’  
 
Rowlands observes that, as a nonhuman animal in the seventeenth or eighteenth 
centuries ‘one of the things you should have made a point of avoiding would be 
Cartesian scientists.  If not, then you could expect to find yourself nailed to a 
vivisection board being slowly cut open.  You would be conscious throughout’ (2002: 
3).  Although human knowledge about nonhuman animals has advanced since 
Cartesian times as ‘modernism has…refused the Cartesianism that denied animals 
affectivity, sentience, and intelligence’ (Emel and Woolch, 1998: 20), Rowlands 
warns, ‘…our present day treatment of many animals is no better than that of the 
Cartesian scientists….in some respects we are much worse…[a]t least, they thought 
that animals were incapable of suffering’ (2002: 5).  Although the ‘moral orthodoxy’xii 
requires that ‘animal experimentation is justified morally if the suffering inflicted on 
animals serves a necessary human purpose’ (Garner, 2005: 125), suffering is 
widespread in nonhuman animal experimentation today.  Yet, the ‘thin veneer of 
civility surrounding human-animal relations’ (Wolch and Emel, 1998: xi) makes much 
of the developments made in laboratories in Britain.  Robert Garner maintains that 
‘The British legislative framework actually goes further than the moral orthodoxy 
prescribes…whereby an experiment must stop – irrespective of the consequences for 
the research – if the suffering inflicted exceeds what is allowed for in the licence’ 
(2005: 124) and Baruch, A. Brody reports that researchers are obliged to use 
sedation and anaesthesia where appropriate and to ‘kill animals painlessly after 
experiences when the animals would otherwise [suffer]’ (2001).  It is not my 
intention here to assess the degree of suffering causedxiii, because it is the premise 
that nonhuman animals can be experimented upon that is my focus.  Nevertheless, 
the degree of suffering is a significant element of the discursive shield used by Pro-
Test. The group confidently claims that ‘[t]he UK has one of the tightest systems of 
regulation in the world, with over 2,000 inspections annually, most of them surprise 
inspections’ (2006b: 3).  Mike Michael and Linda Birke note that in their interviews 
with scientists  ‘…it seemed important to our respondents to convey a belief that 
British animal experimentation is part of a tradition that has directed much effort 
and many resources to the care of animals’ (1994: 195).  Pro-Test further claims that 
concerns about nonhuman animal welfare in laboratories have not only emerged 
from British legal compulsion since, 
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‘…scientists and their lab technicians care deeply about the welfare of the 
animals they work with and are often animal lovers themselves…Wherever 
possible, animals are anaesthetised during testing, meaning they feel no pain, 
while operations are carried out under the same sterile and aseptic 
conditions you would expect in any hospital where humans are treated’ 
(2006b: 3).  
 
An important element of the discursive shield depicts the experimenters as caring 
humans undertaking vital research in the most sensitive of ways rather than as 
causing the suffering of sentient creatures.  In their research Michael and Birke 
noted that scientists analysed their involvement in nonhuman animal 
experimentation in terms of a ‘process of self-definition through comparison and 
differentiation from a group of ‘others’’ (1994: 191).  Accordingly scientists 
distinguish themselves from others to ‘present their own practices of animal 
experimentation in a positive moral light’ (Michael and Birke, 1994: 191). So, 
although scientists embrace notions of value freedom, here we are assured that 
scientists have feelings. Of course they do, but any feelings provoked by nonhuman 
animal suffering in such experiments are secondary in a science that constructs 
human needs as pre-eminent. Pro-Test presents the relationship between key 
laboratory personnel (the experimenters) and nonhuman animals (the experimented 
upon) as like a partnership; these humans work ‘with’ rather than ‘on’ nonhuman 
animals, conceivably implying that nonhuman animals and humans are working 
together for the benefit of humans.  Moreover, Pro-Test asserts that experiments on 
nonhuman animals are undertaken under the same conditions as the treatment of 
humans. Such analogies are intended to assuage any guilt that humans, the 
instigators and beneficiaries of the suffering, might feel.  Furthermore relations of 
compassion that focus on caring humans are an essential part of human primacy 
notions of the superior civilized human consciousness.  In this case this human sense 
of advanced human morality nevertheless confirms human notions of the pre-
eminence of human needs. 
 
The claim that experimentation on nonhuman animals is ‘a necessary tool of 
human progress’ 
 
Pro-Test (2006a) ‘defend[s] scientific research as a necessary tool of human 
progress’.  Hence, for Pro-Test, human progress appears to be measured in terms of 
scientific ‘advancement’ designed to satiate human interests.  Pro-Test is, of course, 
not alone.  The group reports that ‘The House of Lords Select Committee, the 
Parliamentary Animal Procedures Committee and the independent Nuffield Council 
on Bioethics all concluded that testing on animals is a scientifically sound method, 
has yielded great results in the past, and is crucial for future advances.’ (2006c: 1).  
Such advances are based in value judgements founded in the interests of humans 
since ‘[g]enerally, animals are part of the stories of progress, rationality, economic 
growth, and emancipation only by their eradication, sacrifices, bred domesticity, and 
genetic transfiguration’ (Emel and Woolch, 1998: 20).  An equation of human 
advancement with human progress relies on a straightforward notion of the 
meaning of progress.  John Gray’s understanding is much more complex since 
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‘[s]cience enables humans to satisfy their needs…. [t]here is progress in knowledge, 
but not in ethics’ (2002: 155) and for Hans Jonas, as Bauman notes, ‘our moral 
sensitivity has hardly progressed since the time of Adam and Eve’ (2006: 91).  
Nonhuman animals are placed outside of, what William Lynn terms, the ‘moral 
community’ of humanity and ‘this justifies the most brutal and exploitative of power 
relations’ (1998: 286).   But, as Jane Tomkins comments, ‘to see animals differently 
would require human beings to see themselves differently’ (quoted in Adams, 1995: 
12), and Pro-Test is plainly anxious about the effects of such a change.  Their claim 
that we live in a ‘climate that is increasingly misanthropic’ is the kind of protestation 
raised by those whom Lynn (1998) calls ‘species loyalists’ who ‘worry that we lose 
our moral concern for humans when we become concerned about animals’ (1998: 
287).  However, as Lynn asserts, there is no reason to correlate concerns about 
nonhuman animals with lack of concern for humans and ‘if we wish to live morally in 
concert with a diversity of human and nonhuman animals we must adjust our… 




In this paper I have argued that Pro-Test’s endorsement of nonhuman animal 
experimentation is a display of human identity based in assumptions of natural 
hierarchical differences established in distinctions entrenched in human/nonhuman 
animal power relations.  I have maintained that Pro-Test’s support for nonhuman 
animal experimentation is a political expression of human identity; that is human 
primacy identity.  Such expressions are founded in claims of essential characteristics 
of species distinctiveness that locate nonhuman animals as ‘other’ than human, but I 
contend are founded in discourses that construct ‘truths’ about human identity.  
These discourses are based in human conceptualisations and relational 
categorisations where nonhuman animals are grouped collectively as essentially 
inferior ‘other’ and where humans are conceptualised as transcendent ‘us’.  The 
focus on discourses used by Pro-Test has afforded an examination of justifications 
made for experiments on nonhuman animals.  Pro-Test’s reasoning is grounded in a 
mission of human gain based in assumptions about indispensable scientific 
advancements made through nonhuman animal experimentation, about concern for 
the welfare of nonhuman animals when these do not conflict with the needs of 
humans, about the similarities and differences between human and nonhuman 
animals which make experiments at the same time morally acceptable and beneficial 
and about the moral principles they associate with their aims and claims.  However, I 
have argued that such justifications are rooted in the fundamental tenet of the 
human identity as transcendent.   
 
I have maintained that a performative conceptualisation of identity challenges such 
essentialist notions of human identity and attendant perceptions of primacy.  This 
has enabled an exploration of the methods by which human primacy identity claims 
have been made and has facilitated an exploration of how human transcendence is 
founded in and reiterative of a constructed human primacy rather than in a 
confirmed essential human supremacy.  Although organic differences exist, the 
differences among nonhuman animals are certainly as extensive as the differences 
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between human and nonhuman animals.  So organic differences do not provide 
good reason for the continuation of experimentation on nonhuman animals; indeed 
it is organic similarities that are often used in justification of such experimentation.  
Rather, it is differences in power that are, I have argued, at the root of 
experimentation on nonhuman animals, a power embraced by human primacy 
identity politics, a politics that supports and promotes human assumptions of our 
own superiority.  Such human primacy identity assumptions enable the 
disenfranchised bodies of nonhuman animals to be abused in the interests of 
scientific ‘progress’.  For Pro-Test scientific progress is synonymous with human 
progress, but I have argued, this conceptualisation is forged within the virtual region 
of human superiority and actual region of human power.  
 
There are considerable difficulties associated with conjoining a deconstructionist 
analysis of human identity with a moral standpoint against nonhuman animal 
experimentation, since deconstructionist accounts are associated with an 
‘emancipation’ from moral standards (Bauman, 1993:) not least because 
deconstructionists argue that since ‘ethics is contextual’ there are no firm grounds 
for any particular ethical belief’ (Crawford, 1998: 121).  However, Bauman, argues 
against an ‘overtly relativistic and in the end nihilistic view of morality’ (1993: 12).  
For Bauman (1993), it is the very certainties associated with modernity that have 
obstructed self-reflection   Thus, if we conceive of identity as essential ‘our points of 
view will be narrow and our interests narrowly conceived’ (Crawford, 1998: 130-
131).  But if we move away from formulating  ‘human’ as, in Colin Philo’s terms, ‘the 
chief point of reference’ (1998: 54), the very frustration of the certainties associated 
with modernity, for example the deconstruction of enlightenment certainties of self 
and the other, can lead to moral improvement (Bauman 1993: 14).  So 
deconstructionism can lead to the exposure of fissures in modernist assumptions, 
which has enabled questioning of modernist certainties about, for example, the 
other and the position of the other.   For Bauman ‘a postmodern ethics would be one 
that readmits the Other as a neighbour…back from the wasteland of calculated 
interests to which it had been exiled…an ethics that recasts the Other as the crucial 
character in the process through which the moral self comes into its own’ (1993: 84).   
It is when we ‘accord the Other that priority which was once unquestionably 
assigned to the self’ (Bauman 1993: 85) that our moral lives may be enhanced.  
Mohandas K. Gandhi stated that ‘The greatness of a nation and its moral progress 
can be judged on the way its animals are treated’ (Hanru, 2006: 2).  This 
proclamation may be often quoted but that does not detract from its significance.  If 
we recast the other and live morally in concord with nonhuman animals rather than 
promote our notions of our own primacy, we humans could do much good as ‘the 
practice of moral concern across a range of beings and issues may strengthen our 
ethical insights and commitments’ (Lynn 1998: 288).   
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Notes 
                                                 
i I do not explore connections between ‘systems of domination’ (eg how male white 
supremacy pervades the lives of Black people, women and nonhuman animals) (see 
Adams 1990, 1995). 
ii Pro-Test promotes experiments for ‘pure research’ (eg how the brain works), for 
‘applied research’ (eg cures for diseases), and for ‘toxicology research’ (testing 
substances for lethal effects) (Pro-Test 2006e).   
iii The term ‘animal’ is rarely used for humans except with negative connotations 
(Adams 1990). 
iv I use ‘anthropolatric’ (human worship) rather than ‘anthropocentric’ (human as 
centre of the universe) (Chambers 1993) as this term better characterizes human 
primacy.  
v The problems with using nonhuman animals as ‘models’ for human illnesses and 
concerns is highlighted in the near deaths of six human volunteers in the TGN 1412 
trial in 2006 (Dr Hadwen Trust 2006: 5) 
vi Pro-Test’s ‘Ethics’ web page merely states ‘a section of ethics’ (2006d) 
vii I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for making this point. 
viii  For example the President of the Campaign Life Coalition (based in Canada) states 
that ‘The callous disregard for human life is so obvious in the use of embryos for 
research’ (Campaign Life Coalition 2006:1) 
ix Eg the Dr Hadwen Trust argues that ‘[a]nimal studies offer the advantage of 
researching a whole organism, but for medical research they are simply the wrong 
organisms’ (2006: 4) 
x However, it seems that some scientists are cautious about the ultimate scientific 
effectiveness of using mice.  In response to experiments on nonhuman animals that 
revealed that coffee might prevent skin cancer Dr Alison Ross, a science information 
officer for Cancer Research UK, advises ‘caution’ since ‘[t]his study was carried out in 
mice, so we need more research’ (Campbell 2007: 15).    
xi Lack of space precludes discussion of the moral issues associated with genetic 
modification. 
xii Garner notes that the ‘moral orthodoxy’ is the prevailing attitude that nonhuman 
animals have some moral status but that humans are more important (2005: 15). 
xiii However, press reports claim that a high court judge has proclaimed that the 
British government ‘has downplayed the suffering experienced by some animals 
used in experiments by incorrectly applying the law’ (Randerson 2007). 
